What does it all mean?
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the doctrine of the mean
Abinyah Walker
Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics is a difficult work to comprehend because ethics, by its very nature, is an unscientific ideal that describes the role of virtues in human action. Virtues are not concrete and Aristotle steers our understanding of their role in human action as actions that will lead to the achievement of happiness. Aristotle argues that happiness is a product of virtue, and the highest virtue will produce the greatest most sustainable happiness. Aristotle’s first task is to make it clear that we are responsible for our own happiness and that happiness is a voluntary act; moreover, happiness is contrary to fatalism and is grounded in the notion of free will. He describes our actions as the will of rational, voluntary beings.
Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics enumerates many virtues and vices; however, the common underlying theme that unites them is the notion of excesses and deficiencies. What can turn a virtue into vice is imbalance. Aristotle provides us with “the doctrine of the mean” as a way of explaining what he determines is prudence’s relationship to virtue. If we are beings of feeling and action, then reason is the mean by which we can ensure prudence. Aristotle offers Prudence as our compass and companion to reason when determining virtue and vice. Our understanding of the mean can ensure we act towards the good, that we recognize the bad, and the means by which we can judge proportionality. This essay examines three possible definitions of ‘mean’ as we know it today, to discover if Aristotle’s Doctrine of the mean can be a compass that points towards happiness.
For Aristotle justice is an act, and actions are genuinely virtuous; in so much as the purpose of an action is done to achieve some good in itself. If one definition of mean is what is meant, then this would agree with Aristotle’s definition of action1. The agent, in this understanding of Aristotle’s “act”, may not necessarily be acting justly simply intentionally, because to Aristotle to “mean well” requires the qualification of what the agent intends to achieve. First of all, the act must be voluntary. A voluntary act in this sense includes that which is done by children and animals since they too can achieve results2 in the most basic of interpretations, but this does not presume a virtuous act; a virtuous act would require the knowledge and reasoning of the particulars, and in the case of children, would also require responsibility which Aristotle does not presume is within their capacity. Unlike in Plato’s Republic where justice is dealt with in the soul and person, Aristotle’s justice is an externality dealing with person to person interactions. An Aristotelian agent must act based on rational decisions having some end beyond itself, a decision having something more than the child-like or bestial feeling-action equation. Reason, for Aristotle is what separates man from beasts and plants, and is related to the device. A virtuous action must be done in a state that is capable of judging the potential outcomes, and must seek happiness for itself. The process that guides actions towards happiness is reason, while the delimiting factor between virtue and vice is prudence. Both prudence and reason share a deliberative faculty that produces accurate and true views of outcomes3. The modern interpretation of reason has a similar understanding; it is a faculty that draws conclusions from two assumed propositions, and alludes to a debate of thought that decides on the best course of action. A virtuous act, or a reasonable action, requires an understanding of principles, and Aristotle agrees that principles can not be known empirically, or demonstrably, only by an accumulation of particulars and their relations. How we grasp the understanding of principles is unknown and can be said to arise out of a greater force that allows us to grasp the truth. Principles are difficult to reason.
The first understanding of “mean” is a voluntary action as mediated by reason, and is an activity, not just movement or capable action that children or beats can commit, it is an intentionality produced by a deliberative process. The “mean” also possesses the aim of ‘acting well4’ and has some end beyond itself.
The second interpretation of “mean” is something that is moving away from, or contrary to the “good”. Aristotle’s reference to “excellent5” is taking life seriously and in accordance with virtue6, and “mean” in this case would be its opposite. The use of the word mean now takes on the sense of ‘acting badly’, and alludes to irrationality7 and a lack of seriousness. This “mean” tends to avoid reasonable acts that involve good judgment and good arguments and avoids the reliance on usual truths that may be plausible even without certainty. This characterization of “mean” does not search for understanding or deliberation between particulars; it shies away from responsibility, reason and seeking the greater truth. If actions are genuinely virtuous, then a mean person’s actions tend to move away from virtue, and toward vice. As the agent of vice, the agent’s actions are intentional and therefore voluntary; this also makes him responsible for the acts. If good actions can be excellent, then a mean agent does not take his actions seriously or tends to regard the results and consequences as humorous. This lack of seriousness is evident in his treatment of subjects of importance, because their production or craftsmanship are sloppy, inadequate, superficial or unsatisfactory. In written work, it would be considered a bad essay. A mean person can be interpreted as residing in a state of inferiority. His actions, in the case of a bad doctor, would lead to sickness and disease and are often described as unintended or involuntary consequences. This kind of person will often try to deflect blame by saying they did not “mean it/to” it was not their intention, or an intended action. Mean people often find themselves in a state that is in opposition to health and healthy living.
“Mean” can be seen as a lower or bestial act and can be said to be without reason. A mean person acts without good reason and mostly in accordance with only his feelings or desires similar to the way an animal or child would act irresponsibly or irrationally if they are experienced enough to posses those faculties. Mean people tend to remain in a state of excesse or deficiency of character and appetite, while giving control voluntarily to pleasures.
Truly bad persons can be described as the “sort of person, however, more than the other sort, seems to be a self-lover. At any rate he awards himself what is finest and best of all, and gratifies the most controlling part of himself, obeying it in everything.”8 For Aristotle a person who acts out of reason but chooses vice is “Incontinent”. He has the faculty and potential for reason, but acts against reason, or in accordance with his appetites and feelings instead “the incontinent person is like a city that votes for all the right decrees and has excellent laws, but does not apply them” (1152a20) similar to a person who knows the right thing to do, but does wrong anyway. Incontinence is both a deficiency and excess, as in a person who deliberates but chooses the deficient action by reason; the other is emotionally excessive, volatile and impetuous9.
A mean person is said to be unsympathetic or possessing a deficiency of understanding. Understanding for Aristotle involves thought and shows a kind of common sense to react sensibly. The mean person lacks perception and judgment of a situations and of the state of affairs. He is therefore in constant disagreement with others, between his own opinions and his feelings. This person is said to be in disharmony.
Finally, a mean person is quick to draw conclusions; they are deficient deliberators and often, in their haste, come to the wrong conclusion. They lack wisdom in giving practical advice because they do not seek knowledge or study state of affairs, and lead others away from truth, and toward a state of unhappiness.
The third understanding of “mean” is mathematical in nature and deals with the terms in use, it defines means as something that is equally removed from two extremes. In the case of the action, it would be equally removed from deficient and excessive actions. Interpreted mathematically, the mean is the midway point between the first and the last terms of an arithmetical or geometrical progression. If we take the example of the numbers 2 and 8, arithmetically, the mean would be 5, while the geometrically, the mean would be 4. “Mean” can also be interpreted as the quotient sum of several numbers, or the average. In terms of action, this would mean that to reason the most virtuous action would be that which takes into consideration the sum of many terms and states. The reasonable action would take its average as the best course towards happiness. Therefore, a virtuous and reasonable act would be one that takes into consideration a deficient or excessive act or state, and in accordance with the “mean”, would guid the agent towards a state of happiness.
The ‘mean’ is the most accurate guide Aristotle provides to determine virtue and vice. By its very nature, the word mean describes three states: our free will to act meaningfully and in the best interests of good. It also describes how we should be aware of bad actions that steer away from virtue, towards vice, and how excesses and deficiencies of character and thought can cause unhappiness even if at the moment it seems pleasant. Finally, the mean shows us how the same action can vary depending on our attention to the particulars and how states need to be understood by a process of reason when we make our decision to act in a specific way. The “doctrine of the mean” can serve as a compass in our journey of reason, and help us avoid the traps of vice. It is the best means by which we can chart our course towards happiness.
Unfortunately, the ‘mean’ can be applied limitlessly and always detect a hint of excess or deficiency in action. Like in the description of arithmetic and geometric mean, the answers can vary depending upon the preposition and therefore never lends itself to one universal truth. The “real world” is also unfair and imprecise, and can render harsh judgments; it is often said that hindsight is always 20/20. Nonetheless, the mean, even in hindsight, can be redeeming. If we limit our judgments to the confines of available actions as it presented itself to the agent at the time.
A perfect example of exercising the doctrine is for an overweight person because they tend to be excessive over-eaters. They have trouble resisting food because of the immediate pleasures, however if they followed a balanced diet and resist the temptation to eat, they will loose weight. By losing weight, they will lead healthier lives and find happiness by achieving their goal. They can maintain their new lower weight through activity and attain an even greater feeling of happiness.
Bibliography
Irwin, Terence; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd Edition. 1999 Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Pearsall, Judy and Trumble, Bill. The Oxford English Reference Dictionary. 1995 Oxford University Press.
1 The Greek term Praxis usually translates to mean ‘achievable in action’
2 Achieve towards some end.
3 1144a35
4 eupraxia
5 Spoudaios
6 1177a1
7 Illogical, unreasonable
8 1168b34
9 Book VII, Chapter 7, 8 – dictionary meaning “acting or done rashly or with sudden energy”
